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Abstract
Academics have long argued that incentive contracts for executives should be indexed to remove
the inﬂuence of exogenous market factors. Little evidence has been found that ﬁrms engage in such
practices, also termed “relative performance evaluation”. We argue that ﬁr m sm a yn o tg a i nm u c hb y
removing market risks from executive compensation because (i) the market provides compensation
for bearing systematic risk via the market risk premium and therefore the executive desires positive
exposure to such risks, and (ii) the executive can, in principle, adjust her personal portfolio to oﬀset
any unwanted market risk imposed by her compensation contract. A testable implication is that
stock-based performance incentives will be weaker when idiosyncratic risks are large but that market
risks will have little eﬀe c t .T h ed a t at e n dt os u p p o r tt h i sh y p o t h e s i s . I nt h ef u l ls a m p l eo fC E O
compensation from ExecuComp, stock-based incentives are strictly decreasing in ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk.
Market-speciﬁc risks, however, are insigniﬁcantly related to incentives.
The story changes somewhat when we distinguish between younger and older CEOs. Our theory
is arguably less applicable to younger CEOs who have more non-tradeable exposure to systematic
risk through their human capital. Consistent with this argument, we ﬁnd that market risks have
an e g a t i v ee ﬀect on stock-based incentive pay for younger CEOs, while they don’t for older CEOs.
This in turn implies that the traditional argument for indexation is indeed valid for younger CEOs,
and we ﬁnd some evidence in favor of this proposition. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd evidence of indexation
for younger but not for older CEOs. Even for younger CEOs, however, the eﬀect is far too weak
to remove the eﬀects of market risk. This is consistent with our ﬁnding that market risk reduces
pay-performance for young CEOs, but leaves the question of why there is not more indexing for
such executives.
21 Introduction
Researchers are starting to make sense of executive compensation. While there still exists con-
troversy about whether the link between executive compensation and stock price performance is
suﬃciently strong, there is no doubt that the link exists on average and is becoming stronger over
time (Jensen and Murphy (1990), Haubrich (1994), and Hall and Liebman (1998)). Turning to
the enormous heterogeneity in pay sensitivities across ﬁrms, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) ﬁnd
evidence that ﬁrms tie their mangers’ pay more closely to stock values when such values are less
volatile. This conﬁrms the most basic tenet of principal-agent theory. However, empirical research
has not uncovered any systematic evidence of the next most important result, that the agent should
be relieved of risk if this can be done without sacriﬁcing incentives. In particular, Holmstrom (1982)
stresses that the market component of a ﬁrm’s returns should be removed as an executive cannot
aﬀect it with his actions. There is little evidence of such market indexing, either explicitly in the
design of stock options, or implicitly in the determination of option grants and bonuses (see for
example, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a), Antle and Smith (1986), and Janakiraman, Lambert and
Larcker (1992)). Thus, while total stock return volatility seems to matter for compensation, more
speciﬁcally-focussed relative market performance evaluation is seemingly nonexistent.
One explanation for the weak evidence of relative performance evaluation is that some indices
are in fact informative of the agent’s action. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b) and Kedia (1999)
show that using industry performance as a benchmark can have undesirable strategic consequences
for the ﬁrm in imperfectly competitive markets. Consistent with this idea, Aggarwal and Samwick
(1999b) ﬁnd that such performance benchmarking is less prevalent in more concentrated industries.
The theory, however, is less than satisfactory as an explanation for the lack of relative performance
evaluation. First, the theory cannot be fully refuted by the data because strategic considerations
could either increase or decrease the attractiveness of benchmarking, depending on whether com-
petition is in quantities or prices. More importantly, it does not explain why broad market indices
are infrequently used, as no single manager’s output or pricing decision could have a large eﬀect
on an index such as the S&P 500. This is the subject of our paper. Speciﬁcally, we ask:
1. Why might market risks be unimportant for optimal compensation design?
2. Do ﬁrms distinguish between the market-speciﬁc risks and ﬁrm-speciﬁc risks inherent in total
ﬁrm stock returns in their design of compensation packages?
To address these questions, we return to the fundamental issue of the risk-incentive trade-oﬀ,
3and argue that including the returns on the S&P 500 in a compensation contract need not reduce
the risk costs of providing incentives. The reason is that executives also have personal or private
holdings of mutual funds and the like, and in principle they could simply undo any undesired
market exposure from their incentive contracts by scaling back their own personal exposure (see
Feltham and Xie (1994) and Jin (2000) for similar arguments). A potential problem with this
argument is that even wealthy executives may face short-sale constraints or signiﬁcant costs. But
the manager need not necessarily short securities to achieve her desired exposure to systematic
risk. The market provides compensation for bearing such risks, so even a risk-averse manager
would desire some positive exposure to the market. The equity premium coined by Mehra and
Prescott (1986), in fact, maintains that such compensation is extremely generous for a manager
with reasonable risk aversion. Put another way, despite their signiﬁcant exposure to the market
through stock holdings and stock options in their own ﬁrm, doubtless most executives hold personal
investments in positive-beta stocks. Thus, they may be able adjust their total market exposure
without shorting.1
Unfortunately, a direct test of this argument would require information on managers’ private
investment holdings. There is, however, a simple testable implication for the design of incentive
compensation. If managers can oﬀset the market component of risk, then this component is cost-
less for incentive contracting. As a consequence, only the idiosyncratic component of ﬁrm risk
will reduce the optimal slope of the pay-performance relationship. An increase in the systematic
component, however, would have no eﬀect. Our prediction is in stark contrast to Johnson and Tian
(2000) who maintain that ﬁrms could provide their executives with more high-powered incentives
if they were to ﬁlter out the market component of risk. We begin with the recognition that ﬁrms
do not generally do such explicit ﬁltration, but do diﬀe ri nt h ea m o u n to fm a r k e ta n dﬁrm-speciﬁc
risk that they pose for their executives. We can then determine empirically whether ﬁrms with
a smaller amount of market risk actually do provide more high-powered incentives. Our model
predict that they will not, but that ﬁrms with a smaller amount of ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk will oﬀer more
high-powered incentives.
To test our hypothesis, we use similar data and techniques to Aggarwal and Samwick’s (1999a)
study which documented the importance of total ﬁrm risk for executive compensation. We extend
their approach by decomposing risk into its systematic and idiosyncratic components. We ﬁnd,
as does Jin (2000) in contemporaneous work, that idiosyncratic risk has a signiﬁcantly greater
1Similar intuitions have been purported elsewhere in economics. Using cross-sectional Italian household survey
data, Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese (1996) ﬁnd that individuals reduce their share of risky assets when their income
risk rises. This is consistent with economic theory and the idea we have in mind for CEOs.
4negative eﬀect on pay sensitivities than does systematic risk. In fact, the coeﬃc i e n to nm a r k e tr i s k
is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
The above results hold for our entire sample of executives. We then recognize that at least some
executives may not be able to fully oﬀset market risks from their compensation as we have assumed.
We argue that younger executives are more likely to be in this position as the value of their human
capital is both imperfectly tradeable and faces greater exposure to market changes than that of
older executives who have already realized more of the value of their human capital. Consistent
with this argument, we ﬁnd that market risk does have a signiﬁcant and negative eﬀect on the
use of stock-based compensation for younger executives, but has no eﬀect for older executives.2
This ﬁnding in turn suggests that market indexation is valuable for younger executives.3 We ﬁnd
conﬁrming evidence of relative performance evaluation for younger executives, and no such eﬀect
for older executives. Indexation is far from complete, however, meaning that younger executives
are still exposed to a substantial amount of market risk despite the fact that such exposure imposes
the (observable) cost of weaker pay-for-performance. The Johnson and Tian (2000) argument that
stock options should be indexed to remove market movements appears to have merit for younger
executives.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the model of how
executives can adjust their market exposure in light of the market risk inherit in their compensation
package. Section 3 contains the empirical results supporting our hypothesis that ﬁrm-speciﬁcr i s k
is more costly than market risk in a stock-based compensation package. Section 4 distinguishes
between younger and older executives. Concluding remarks are in Section 5.
2 A Simple Model
We model a ﬁrm managed by a single executive with negative exponential utility and a coeﬃcient
of risk-aversion of ρ.S h e e x e r t s e ﬀort a which increases ﬁrm value at a constant rate of one, but
has a strictly convex cost of C(a). We normalize the risk-free rate to zero and denote the market
risk premium by rm with associated variance of σ2
m. Contracts can be written on changes in ﬁrm
value, which are determined by the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) plus any innovations in
2This argument should be distinguished from that of Gibbons and Murphy (1992) that younger executives may
need weaker compensation-based incentives because their career concerns tend to already align their interests with
those of their shareholders. We are not asking which type of executive has stronger incentives overall, but rather
whether risk has a diﬀerential eﬀect on the optimal incentives provided to younger versus older executives. As can
be seen in Tables 6A and 6B, overall sensitivities of pay to performance are similar for older and younger CEOs.
3Thanks to Paul Oyer for pointing out this implication of our ﬁndings for younger versus older executives.
5managerial eﬀort. Thus, the ﬁrm’s total returns are:
rT = βrm + ε +( a − E(a)). (1)
Shareholders in the ﬁrm are fully diversiﬁed so the market premium just compensates them for
the risk β2σ2
m. They require no compensation for bearing the remaining idiosyncratic risk, which
has variance σ2
ε. Thus, their utility is determined only by the manager’s eﬀort net of its cost, and
any risk premium they have to pay her. We restrict attention to linear incentive contracts of the
form W + αrT and normalize the manager’s reservation utility to zero. By requiring the ﬁrm to
place the weight α on all components of ﬁrm returns, we are not allowing the ﬁrm to use relative
p e r f o r m a n c ee v a l u a t i o n .B u ta sw es h a l ls o o ns e e ,t h e r ei sn ob e n e ﬁt to using such compensation
schemes under our assumptions.
The above assumptions are a simpliﬁed version of a standard principal-agent model. We depart
from the standard approach by allowing the manager to choose her own personal holdings, letting
δ denote the fraction of her wealth that she holds in the market portfolio. We do not consider
the possibility that the manager can also adjust her exposure to her ﬁrm’s idiosyncratic risk; see
Garvey (1997) and Bettis, Coles and Lemmon (2000) for analyses of how managers might eﬀectively
short their own ﬁrms to avoid such exposure.4 With these considerations in hand, the manager’s
participation constraint can be written as:









There are two incentive compatibility constraints. The ﬁrst is that the manager choose eﬀort
in her own interest, which can be expressed as the ﬁrst-order condition:
∂U
∂a
= α − Ca =0 . (3)
The second is that the manager choose her own most preferred market holding, which requires:
∂U
∂δ
= rm − ρ(αβ + δ)σ2
m =0 , ( 4 )






4Garvey (1997) shows that ﬁrms must generally turn to alternative control mechanisms such as debt when managers
can costlessly short their own ﬁrms. Bettis, Coles and Lemmon (2000) document the extensive use of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
bans on such trading in addition to the SEC’s restriction on insider trading.
6Substituting δ∗ into the participation constraint yields:
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ε)=0 , ( 7 )






Thus, optimal pay-performance depends only on idiosyncratic risk. The key to the result of
course is the manager’s private holding δ∗ = rm
ρσ2
m − αβ completely oﬀsets any incremental market
exposure from the incentive contract, αβ. The manager could encounter short-sales constraints if
the required δ∗ is negative. But as documented by Mehra and Prescott (1986), the average premium
on the market is approximately 7.5%, while the volatility is only around 12%, translating into a
variance of 1.44%. This is known as the equity premium puzzle since the manager would rationally
choose to short risk-free assets rather than the market portfolio even if her aversion to risk was
extremely high (see also Kulatilaka (1996)).
For our purposes, the implication is that the ﬁrst term in the manager’s optimal market holdings
(see (5)), rm
ρσ2
m, may well exceed her proportional exposure to the market from her incentive contract
αβ,e v e ni ft h em a n a g e ri so ﬀered high-powered incentives. In more common-sense terms, most
CEOs are likely to hold mutual funds or other private exposure to the market even when their wealth
is tightly linked to their ﬁrm’s stock returns. While we do not have data on executives’ private
holdings, we can however test the implications of the model for the pay-performance relationship.
In what follows, we delineate the model’s testable predictions and confront them with the data.
3 Data and Basic Empirical Results
3.1 Hypotheses to be tested
A direct implication of our model is that the market component of risk has no eﬀect on stock incen-
tives, while idiosyncratic risk has a signiﬁcant, negative eﬀect. Our tests can now be formulated
as a simple extension of the speciﬁcation in Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a). They estimate the
relationship
Compensation = K + b1rT + b2σ2
T + b3(rT × σ2
T),
7where Compensation is the change in the CEO’s ﬁrm-related wealth, rT is the dollar return to
shareholders and σ2
T is the cdf of the total variance of dollar returns. They transform total
risk (stock return volatility) into a cumulative density function (cdf) where ﬁrms with the lowest
volatility are in the low end of the cdf, and ﬁrms with high risk are in the high end. In their
regression speciﬁcation, the ﬁrst coeﬃcient, b1, is the executive’s pay-performance for a ﬁrm with
the lowest risk, and b2 is the direct eﬀe c to fr i s ko np a y .T h ec o e ﬃcient b3 is of greatest interest as
it captures the extent to which stock-based incentives are reduced when total ﬁrm risk is greater.
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) ﬁnd as hypothesized that b3 is negative in the data.
Our model dictates a similar speciﬁcation, but we argue that ﬁrm-speciﬁc and market-speciﬁc
risk have diﬀerent costs. Thus, a direct test of our amended model is to estimate the following
augmented speciﬁcation:
Compensation = K + b1rT + b2β2σ2
M + b3σ2




M is the cdf of the market component of ﬁrm dollar returns, and σ2
ε is the cdf of the
idiosyncratic component of dollar returns. With this speciﬁcation, we can distinguish between a
weak-form and a strong-form implication of our model, analogous to Janakiraman, Lambert and
Larcker (1992). The weak-form implication is that while both b4 and b5 are negative, b4 is smaller
in absolute value, meaning that systematic risk has a smaller eﬀect on compensation than does
ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk. The strong-form implication is that b4 is zero, meaning that risk has no eﬀect on
stock-based incentives when it stems from market sources.
The strong-form hypothesis requires executives to be able to fully oﬀset unwanted market
exposure from their incentive contracts. Consider, however, the position of a young executive who
has a large fraction of his wealth tied up in his ﬁrm’s shares and options, and whose human capital
has a beta of one and represents a fraction θ of his wealth. Such an executive would need to set his
personal ﬁnancial holdings at δ =( rm/ρσ2
m) − αβ − θ. If this value is negative, or if it is so small
as to threaten his ability to invest in tax-preferred retirement vehicles, he may be eﬀectively averse
to market risk from his employer. Market risk would be costly for incentive contracting with such
an executive, and we would expect to ﬁnd that it has a negative eﬀect on estimated stock-based
incentives along with the ﬁrm-speciﬁc piece. On the other hand, older CEOs have most likely
realized many of the returns on their human capital and consequently are less averse to market
risk. We test these hypotheses in what follows.
83.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our data come from two primary sources. Firm betas and returns are estimated from CRSP,
and the compensation data come from Standard and Poors’ ExecuComp. Our sample period is
from 1992 to 1998, beginning in the ﬁrst year of the ExecuComp data and extending two years
longer than Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a). Table 1 summarizes the basic variables of interest.
Our study uses just over 1,400 large American ﬁrms, which pay their CEOs a salary and a bonus
that both average approximately $600,000 per year. As is well-known, stock option grants are the
largest component of compensation, at least if they are valued according to Black-Scholes. Our
ﬁrms granted options with an average Black-Scholes value of nearly $1.4 million each year, but
the median is far more modest at just under $400,000. This divergence, plus the extremely large
maximum grant value, indicate the presence of some extreme outliers in the data. To reduce the
eﬀect of such outliers on our inferences, we follow Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) and estimate
m e d i a nr e g r e s s i o n sa sw e l la sO L Sr e g r e s s i o n so nw i n s o r i z e dd a t a . 5
Our beta and standard deviation values are computed using the preceding ﬁve years of monthly
data. The betas reported in this paper use a simple OLS regression of log returns on the returns
to the value-weighted CRSP index. Results are virtually identical if we compute Scholes-Williams
beta values. Not surprisingly, since our sample includes virtually the entire S&P 500 and other
prominent ﬁrms, the average and median betas are essentially one. Betas vary widely in the sample,
which is important for our purposes as we need to identify the eﬀect of the market component of
ﬁrm risk on compensation and how it potentially diﬀers from the ﬁrm-speciﬁc component.
The simple correlations reported in Table 2 reveal few surprises. All components of compensa-
tion are positively related to one another and are positively related to ﬁrm size. Larger ﬁrms also
tend to be less risky as measured by percent stock returns, and in our sample period the small ﬁrm
eﬀect has largely disappeared. The various components of pay are all positively related to stock
returns, although our interest is in how this relationship varies across the sample and we now turn
to this task.
3.3 Eﬀects of systematic versus ﬁrm-speciﬁcr i s k
To insure that our extended data sample concur with the Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) ﬁndings,
we ﬁrst replicate their results in Table 3. The dependent variable is the change in the manager’s
5The youngest CEO in our sample was the 24-year old CEO of Carson Pierie Scott in 1995, who lasted only one
year. Michael Dell was the second-youngest CEO at 29 in 1993. Our oldest CEO is Norman E. Alexander of the
Sequa Corporation who was 84 years old in 1998.
9wealth stemming from ﬁrm sources, deﬁned as the sum of cash compensation, the Black-Scholes
value of new options granted, the value of restricted stock, long-term incentive payments, and
changes in the value of existing options and shares. Since we are interested in changes in CEO
wealth, we end up with six years of pay changes data from the 1992-1998 time series. Similar
to Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a), we use dollar values for both returns and for risk measures as
this is the correct unit in theory.6 We also follow their convenient normalization of transforming
the variance of dollar returns into its empirical cumulative density function, so that the estimated
coeﬃcient on the interaction of dollar returns and the cdf of dollar risk represents the eﬀect on
pay-performance of moving from the least to the most risky ﬁrm in our sample. We also include
year dummies to control for changes in pay levels over time.
In the ﬁrst column of Table 3, we estimate an OLS regression with robust standard errors. We
ﬁnd that the pay-for-performance sensitivity is $47 per $1,000 increase in market capitalization
for a CEO in a ﬁrm with the lowest total variance. The ﬁrm with median variance awards its
CEO with a pay-for-performance sensitivity of $47 − 1
2 × $45.2=$ 2 4 .4. For the ﬁrm with the
maximum variance, the pay sensitivity is $47−$45.2=$ 1 .8. Turning to the median regression in
the second column, we replicate almost exactly Aggarwal and Samwick’s ﬁnding that the sensitivity
of pay to stock price performance is strongly negatively related to ﬁrm risk, so that a ﬁrm with the
highest level of risk has almost no sensitivity of pay to the stock price. Observe that we estimate a
somewhat smaller median pay-performance sensitivity of $12.33 (Aggarwal and Samwick’s (1999a)
median pay sensitivity is $14.52), but our sample period is longer.
Table 4 contains the empirical analysis of our model’s prediction that market risk should not
matter for performance pay. Market risk is speciﬁe da st h ee m p i r i c a lc d fo ft h ed o l l a rv a r i a n c e
that is due to the market, and ﬁrm risk is the cdf of the remaining dollar risk. Under the OLS and
median regressions in the ﬁrst and second columns, we ﬁnd support for our hypothesis that market
risk has no eﬀect statistically on incentive-based pay compensation. In the case of the median
regression, the estimated pay sensitivity is
$22.06 − $15.4 × cdf(ﬁrm-speciﬁcv a r i a n c e )− $0 × cdf(market-speciﬁc variance).
Therefore, a CEO in a ﬁrm with the median level of ﬁrm-speciﬁcv a r i a n c ei sa w a r d e dap a ys e n -
sitivity of $22.06 − $15.4 × 1
2 =$ 1 4 .36, irrespective of the ﬁrm’s level of market-speciﬁcv a r i a n c e .
The OLS estimates are also consistent with the strong-form implication of our model, and thus
6It is well-known (see, e.g., Garen (1994)) that percentage risk often has a positive rather than a negative eﬀect on
pay-performance. However, the theory is inconclusive with respect to this measure. The risk imposed on an executive
f r o mt y i n gh i sp a yt ot h eﬁrm is correctly speciﬁed in dollar terms.
10the data are very encouraging for our model’s prediction that ﬁrms do adjust pay sensitivities to
ﬁrm-speciﬁcr i s km u c hm o r et h a nt om a r k e t - s p e c i ﬁc risks.
3.4 Assessment of the results
Our empirical results are arguably quite strong. Moreover, the measurement error that undoubt-
edly exists in our tests tends against our ﬁndings. To see this, consider the following. Even if we
have avoided problems of bid-ask bounce and time-varying risk by using monthly returns and a
ﬁve-year window, our estimates of the market component of risk are sure to be noisy. Additionally,
our market index is not a perfect measure of the market portfolio, and second our β estimates
are just that, estimates. Such errors will tend to bring the estimated eﬀects of the two types of
risks closer together. There are then two possibilities. First, we might be underestimating the
market component. This will inﬂate the risk component without aﬀecting its covariance with the
manager’s pay, thereby reducing the estimated coeﬃcient on the idiosyncratic component without
aﬀecting our estimate of the market component’s eﬀect on incentive pay. Second, a similar eﬀect
occurs in cases where we overestimate the market component. Now we will incorrectly label some
of the idiosyncratic risk as market risk, therefore erroneously obtaining a negative coeﬃcient on
the market as well as the idiosyncratic component.
A related problem in our empirical speciﬁcations is the multicollinearity between our alternative
measures of risk. While multicollinearity is inevitable when using interaction terms, there is another
less obvious issue when we decompose returns into their components. While it is theoretically
correct to use dollar values for both types of risk, this inevitably introduces a signiﬁcant positive
correlation between market and ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk. Large ﬁrms tend to have the highest values
for both types of risk. Apparently, however, we can still estimate distinct coeﬃcients for the two
variables.
Turning to theoretical considerations, Prendergast (2000) argues that the importance of CEO
eﬀort may be positively correlated with risk, making it diﬃcult to separately identify the negative
and direct eﬀect of risk on stock-based pay. Like Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a), we are able to
estimate a negative coeﬃcient, at least for ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk. Prendergast’s (2000) argument can
explain our results if CEO eﬀort is more positively correlated with systematic than with idiosyn-
cratic risk. We see no reason why this should be the case, but like Jin (2000), our results are robust
to crude controls for the importance of CEO eﬀort such as tobin’s q or the CEO’s length of service
(see also Gibbons and Murphy (1992)).7
7Tenure is positively associated with age, all else equal, but does not provide as plausible a measure of the
11Jin (2000) reports similar results to ours in a regression that uses estimated pay-performance
sensitivity as the dependent variable. He also reports tests controlling for executive and ﬁrm ﬁxed-
eﬀects. While he ﬁnds that the results are qualitatively similar, we are skeptical of such controls
for our purposes because they restrict attention to changes over time in betas and in risk. To
reduce measurement error, we have estimated these variables using ﬁve-year windows so that year-
to-year changes are muted. Equally important, it is well known that estimated volatilities tend to
be mean-reverting, while compensation contracts should presumably be set based on stable ﬁrm
parameters.
This is not, however, to say that executive attributes are unimportant to our results. The critical
assumption of the theory is that executives have no demand for employer-provided insurance from
systematic risk as they can arrange this for themselves. As argued earlier, this assumption is less
plausible for younger executives who are most likely less diversiﬁed in both their human capital
and ﬁnancial capital. To test this argument, we now decompose our sample according to the age
of the executive.
4 The diﬀerences between younger and older CEOs
4.1 Eﬀects of CEO Age on Pay-Sensitivities
In Tables 5A and 5B, we replicate the Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) method for younger CEOs
(those who are no older than 56) and older CEOs (those who are older than 56). We obtain similar
results if we use a continuous measure of age and interact it with our risk measures, but the results
here are more intuitive and allow all coeﬃcients to diﬀer according to age. The pay sensitivity for
the CEO of a ﬁrm with median ﬁrm variance appears to be nearly identical for the younger and
older CEOs. OLS gives a pay sensitivity for a ﬁrm with median variance at $23.75 for younger
CEOs, and $25.0 for median older CEOs. In the median regression for younger CEOs, the median
sensitivity is $12.45, and is $12.65 for the older CEOs. Thus, Aggarwal and Samwick’s (1999a)
results are not particularly sensitive to CEO age.
Given that the eﬀects of total ﬁrm variance are not CEO age-dependent, we now test our more
general speciﬁcation on the two age groups. In Tables 6A and 6B,w ee s t i m a t et h er e l a t i o n s h i p
b e t w e e nc h a n g e si nC E Ow e a l t ho nb o t hﬁrm-speciﬁc and market-speciﬁcr i s k sf o rC E O sb e l o wa n d
above the median age. In both regression models, market-speciﬁc risks are signiﬁcantly related
importance of market-sensitive human capital. Also, the correlation between tenure and age is less than 15% in our
sample.
12to pay sensitivities for younger CEOs. In fact, in the median regression, ﬁrm-speciﬁcr i s k sa r e
no longer important. Their importance does remain in the OLS speciﬁcation and in a robust
regression available from the authors upon request. We conclude from the empirical results in
Table 6A that market risks and ﬁrm-speciﬁc risks are important for younger CEOs. This supports
the idea that younger CEOs are less diversiﬁed and prefer some insurance from the ﬁrms for which
they work. Turning to the older CEOs, the analysis contained in Table 6B shows that market-
speciﬁc risks do not aﬀect pay sensitivities for older CEOs. Neither of the speciﬁcations exhibit
as i g n i ﬁcant coeﬃcient for market risk. This is consistent with older CEOs having less of their
wealth in the form of non-marketable human capital and in turn being better able to better able
to oﬀset unwanted market risks imposed by their employers’ compensation packages.
4.2 Evidence of indexing for younger and older executives
To this point we have presumed that ﬁrms do not index executive compensation. This is a reasonable
presumption based on past research and on the fact that executive stock option plans almost without
exception have an exercise price that is ﬁxed at grant date rather than linked to any market index.
The results in Section 3 suggest that this practice has little cost for the average ﬁrm. However,
the results on younger and older CEOs reported in the previous subsection modify this conclusion;
market-indexed compensation may be valueless for ﬁrms with older executives, but exposure to
market risks seems to impose a cost for ﬁrms with younger executives.
Table 7 conﬁrms the standard ﬁnding that the average ﬁrm does not ﬁlter out the eﬀects of
market movements in determining executive compensation. The ﬁrst two columns use the simplest
possible benchmark; the return the ﬁrm would have achieved if it had exactly tracked the value-
weighted S&P 500. If ﬁrms used such a benchmark in evaluating their executives, we would ﬁnd
an e g a t i v ec o e ﬃcient on this index. The intuition is that a given level of ﬁrm performance is less
impressive when the overall market has performed better. We ﬁnd no evidence of such an eﬀect in
the data. The last two columns in Table 7 follow basic ﬁnance theory and the theory of relative
performance evaluation more closely; in order to remove the market component of their returns it is
necessary to adjust for the ﬁrm’s exposure to such risks. Accordingly, the new dependent variable
is the expected dollar return the ﬁrm should have produced in a given year according to the capital
asset pricing model. The results do not indicate that ﬁrms make use of such an index either.
Table 8 returns to the simple S&P 500 benchmark but distinguishes between younger and older
executives. The results of Section 3 imply that ignoring this benchmark has little cost for ﬁrms
13with older executives, but that this practice is costly with a younger executive. Consistent with
this, we ﬁnd evidence of indexation for the younger, but not for the older subsample of CEOs.
If indexation were complete, however, the negative coeﬃcient on the index would be of the same
magnitude as the positive coeﬃcient on ﬁrm returns. In no speciﬁcation is the eﬀect of the index
even one-ﬁfth as large as that of ﬁrm returns.
One explanation for this last result is that we have incorrectly speciﬁed the index. Theory does
not suggest that ﬁrms should simply take out the returns from a market index. Rather, they should
also account for their own ﬁrm’s exposure to such an index. Table 9 recognizes this by replacing
the S&P benchmark with the CAPM dollar expected return for each ﬁrm i,d e ﬁned as the market
capitalization at the beginning of the year t times rft + βit(rmt − rft). The risk-free rate is the
30-year t-bill rate for the year, the beta is estimated for each ﬁrm-year using the previous ﬁve years
of monthly data, and the return on the market is the realized return on the value-weighted S&P
500 as used in Table 8. While this index is better grounded in theory, the empirical results are
s o m e w h a tw e a k e rt h a nt h o s eu s i n gt h es i m p l em a r k e ti n d e x .W ec o n ﬁrm that such theoretically-
preferred relative performance is used in practice for younger and not for older executives, but also
conﬁrm that younger executives are still exposed to signiﬁcant market risk.
The results reported in this section use the simplest possible speciﬁcation to assess the use
of relative performance evaluation. We obtain the same conclusion if we use the more elaborate
methods of Janakiraman, Lambert and Larcker (1992) or Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a): (i) there
is no evidence of relative performance evaluation for older executives and (ii) there is such evidence
for younger executives, but the indexation is far from complete. This second ﬁnding is consistent
with our earlier result that market risk is negatively associated with the use of stock-based pay for
younger executives. If indexation were complete, we would not ﬁnd such an eﬀect; employers would
provide young executives with the same level of insurance from market risks that older executives
can apparently provide for themselves.
5 Concluding remarks
Market-indexed incentive pay is only valuable if executives have a demand for employer-provided
insurance from systematic risk. Our empirical results suggest that many executives have little
demand for such insurance. There is evidence that younger CEOs do have some such demand, and
market-indexed compensation schemes such as options could be valuable in this setting. We ﬁnd
some evidence that such indexation is used in practice, but not nearly to the extent predicted by
14other theories (e.g., Holmstrom (1982)).
It should be emphasized that our results apply only to the use of broad market indices. Our
theoretical arguments do not necessarily apply to narrower industry indices because (i) trading in
such indices may not be well-developed and (ii) such indices may not provide positive expected
returns so that the executive desires no exposure to such risks and would need to short-sell in order
to oﬀset exposure from the compensation contract.
We should also stress that we use a traditional principal-agent setting where the cost of providing
incentives to the executive is ineﬃcient risk bearing. An alternative view is that the executive’s
participation constraint does not bind so that the cost of incentive pay is actually the dollar value
of the stock or option that the executive is granted. In such a setting, indexation may appear more
appealing. For example, Johnson and Tian (2000) show that by indexing the exercise price of a
stock option, the ﬁrm can signiﬁcantly reduce its value to the executive without greatly reducing
its hedge ratio, that is, its sensitivity to changes in the stock price. Our empirical results still
call this interpretation into question, since we ﬁnd that ﬁrms are more willing to provide stock-
based pay when risks are driven by the market rather than ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors. The alternative
would have to be that boards simply have little concern for the fact that they are “giving away”
shareholders’ money by so doing. Of course, such an interpretation is a radical departure from
standard principal-agent theory in which contracts are set to maximize shareholder wealth subject
to constraints of eﬀort and risk.
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17Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Salary and Bonus represent the CEO’s yearly salary and bonus values. Option Value represents the
Black-Scholes value of the options granted to the CEO in the year. CEO Age is the CEO’s age in the data
year. Stock return is the percentage return for the ﬁrm over its ﬁscal year. Market Cap of Equity is the
ﬁrm’s market capitalization at the end of the ﬁrm’s ﬁscal year. Our beta and standard deviation values
are computed using the preceding ﬁve years of monthly data. The betas reported in this paper use a simple
OLS regression of log returns on the returns to the value-weighted CRSP index. Compensation data and
market value are in millions of yearly dollars.
Variable Obs Mean Median SD Min Max
Salary 6,488 0.577 0.525 0.306 0 3.65
Bonus 6,488 0.584 0.308 1798 0 102
Option Value (Black-Scholes) 6,461 1.39 0.353 4917 0 193.5
Age of CEO (years) 6,488 51.7 56 17.0 24 84
Stock return (%) 6,483 19.70 13.25 100.4 -97.2 7150
Market Cap of Equity 6,488 4030 1054 10.41 1.51 239.6
Beta 5,961 1.106 1.051 0.577 -1.96 5.50
Standard deviation of % returns 5,961 33.93 30.51 15.4 7.59 177
18T a b l e2 :S i m p l eC o r r e l a t i o n s
Salary and Bonus represent the CEO’s yearly salary and bonus values. Option Value represents the
Black-Scholes value of the options granted to the CEO in the year. CEO Age is the CEO’s age in the data
year. Stock return is the percentage return for the ﬁrm over its ﬁscal year. Market Cap of Equity is the
ﬁrm’s market capitalization at the end of the ﬁrm’s ﬁscal year. Our beta and standard deviation of returns
(SD returns) values are computed using the preceding ﬁve years of monthly data. The betas reported in this

















CEO Age 0.226 0.073 0.033 1
Returns 0.013 0.098 0.103 0.014 1
Market
Cap
0.473 0.175 0.175 0.109 -0.030 1
Beta -0.043 0.065 0.065 -0.068 0.057 -0.054 1
SD
Returns
-0.281 0.033 0.033 -0.176 0.020 -0.215 0.540 1
19Table 3: Changes in CEO Wealth — Total Firm Risk
This table contains an OLS regression and a median regression with bootstrapped standard errors of
changes in CEO wealth regressed on ﬁrm dollar returns, the interaction of dollar returns and the cdf of total
ﬁrm dollar variance, the cdf of total ﬁrm dollar variance, and year dummies. Changes in CEO wealth is
deﬁned as cash compensation plus the Black-Scholes value of new options granted plus the value of restricted
stock plus long-term incentive payments, plus changes in the value of existing options and shares. For the OLS
regression, the data are winsorized at the 1% tails and robust standard errors are calculated. Standard errors
are in parentheses for both methods and the Pseudo-R2 is reported for the median regression. Estimated
coeﬃcients for the year eﬀects are suppressed. * indicates diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level, ** at the 5%
level and *** at the 10% level.


















Sample Size 5,931 5,931
20Table 4: Changes in CEO Wealth — Firm and Market Risk
This table contains an OLS regression and a median regression with bootstrapped standard errors of
changes in CEO wealth regressed on ﬁrm dollar returns, the interaction of dollar returns and the cdf of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc dollar variance, the interaction of dollar returns and the cdf of systematic dollar variance, the
cdf of ﬁrm-speciﬁc dollar variance, the cdf of systematic dollar variance, and year dummies. Changes in
CEO wealth is deﬁned as cash compensation plus the Black-Scholes value of new options granted plus the
value of restricted stock plus long-term incentive payments, plus changes in the value of existing options
and shares. For the OLS regression, the data were winsorized at the 1% tails and robust standard errors
are calculated. For the OLS regression, the data are winsorized at the 1% tails and robust standard errors
are calculated. Standard errors are in parentheses for both methods and the Pseudo-R2 is reported for the
median regression. Estimated coeﬃcients for the year eﬀects are suppressed. * indicates diﬀerent from zero
at the 1% level.


























Sample Size 5,931 5,931
21Table 5A: Changes in CEO Wealth for Younger CEOs — Total Risk
This table contains an OLS regression and a median regression with bootstrapped standard errors of
changes in CEO wealth regressed on ﬁrm dollar returns, the interaction of dollar returns and the cdf of total
ﬁrm dollar variance, the cdf of total ﬁrm dollar variance, and year dummies. Changes in CEO wealth is
deﬁned as cash compensation plus the Black-Scholes value of new options granted plus the value of restricted
stock plus long-term incentive payments, plus changes in the value of existing options and shares. For the
OLS regression, the data are winsorized at the 1% tails and robust standard errors are calculated. For
the OLS regression, the data were winsorized at the 1% tails and robust standard errors are calculated.
This sample contains all CEOs whose age is at or below the median age of 56 years old. Standard errors
are in parentheses for both methods and the Pseudo-R2 is reported for the median regression. Estimated
coeﬃcients for the year eﬀects are suppressed. * indicates diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level, ** at the 5%
level, and *** at the 10% level.


















Sample Size 2,768 2,768
22Table 5B: Changes in CEO Wealth for Older CEOs — Total Risk
This table contains an OLS regression and a median regression with bootstrapped standard errors of
changes in CEO wealth regressed on ﬁrm dollar returns, the interaction of dollar returns and the cdf of total
ﬁrm dollar variance, the cdf of total ﬁrm dollar variance, and year dummies. Changes in CEO wealth is
deﬁned as cash compensation plus the Black-Scholes value of new options granted plus the value of restricted
stock plus long-term incentive payments, plus changes in the value of existing options and shares. For the
OLS regression, the data are winsorized at the 1% tails and robust standard errors are calculated. For
the OLS regression, the data were winsorized at the 1% tails and robust standard errors are calculated.
This sample contains all CEOs whose age is above the median age of 56 years old. Standard errors are
in parentheses for both methods and the Pseudo-R2 is reported for the median regression. Estimated
coeﬃcients for the year eﬀects are suppressed. * indicates diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level and ** at the
5% level.


















Sample Size 2,742 2,742
23Table 6A: Changes in CEO Wealth for Younger CEOs — Firm and Market
Risk
This table contains an OLS regression and a median regression with bootstrapped standard errors of
changes in CEO wealth regressed on ﬁrm dollar returns, the interaction of dollar returns and the cdf of ﬁrm-
speciﬁc dollar variance, the interaction of dollar returns and the cdf of systematic dollar variance, the cdf
of ﬁrm-speciﬁc dollar variance, the cdf of systematic dollar variance, and year dummies. Changes in CEO
wealth is deﬁned as cash compensation plus the Black-Scholes value of new options granted plus the value of
restricted stock plus long-term incentive payments, plus changes in the value of existing options and shares.
For the OLS regression, the data are winsorized at the 1% tails and robust standard errors are calculated.
For the OLS regression, the data were winsorized at the 1% tails and robust standard errors are calculated.
This sample contains all CEOs whose age is at or below the median age of 56 years old. Standard errors
are in parentheses for both methods and the Pseudo-R2 is reported for the median regression. Estimated
coeﬃcients for the year eﬀects are suppressed. * indicates diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level, ** at the 5%
level, and *** at the 10% level.


























Sample Size 2,768 2,768
24Table 6B: Changes in CEO Wealth for Older CEOs — Firm and Market
Risk
This table contains an OLS regression and a median regression with bootstrapped standard errors of
changes in CEO wealth regressed on ﬁrm dollar returns, the interaction of dollar returns and the cdf of ﬁrm-
speciﬁc dollar variance, the interaction of dollar returns and the cdf of systematic dollar variance, the cdf
of ﬁrm-speciﬁc dollar variance, the cdf of systematic dollar variance, and year dummies. Changes in CEO
wealth is deﬁned as cash compensation plus the Black-Scholes value of new options granted plus the value of
restricted stock plus long-term incentive payments, plus changes in the value of existing options and shares.
For the OLS regression, the data are winsorized at the 1% tails and robust standard errors are calculated.
For the OLS regression, the data were winsorized at the 1% tails and robust standard errors are calculated.
This sample contains all CEOs whose age is above the median age of 56 years old. Standard errors are
in parentheses for both methods and the Pseudo-R2 is reported for the median regression. Estimated
coeﬃcients for the year eﬀects are suppressed. * indicates diﬀe r e n tf r o mz e r oa tt h e1 %l e v e la n d* * *a tt h e
10% level.


























Sample Size 2,742 2,742
25Table 7: Testing for Benchmarking Eﬀects on the Full Sample
This table contains an OLS regression and a median regression with bootstrapped standard errors of
changes in CEO wealth regressed on ﬁrm dollar returns, benchmark dollar returns, the interaction of dollar
returns and the cdf of ﬁrm-speciﬁc dollar variance, the interaction of dollar returns and the cdf of systematic
dollar variance, the cdf of ﬁrm-speciﬁc dollar variance, the cdf of systematic dollar variance, and year
dummies. Changes in CEO wealth is deﬁned as cash compensation plus the Black-Scholes value of new
options granted plus the value of restricted stock plus long-term incentive payments, plus changes in the value
of existing options and shares. Benchmark dollar returns in the S&P 500 regressions use the return on an
equivalent sized investment in the value-weighted S&P 500 and the benchmark. Benchmark dollar returns
in the CAPM regressions are based on expected dollar returns using the 30-year T-bill rate as the riskless
rate and ﬁrm-speciﬁc betas. For the OLS regression, the data are winsorized at the 1% tails and robust
standard errors are calculated. Standard errors are in parentheses for both methods and the Pseudo-R2 is
reported for the median regression. Estimated coeﬃcients for the year eﬀects are suppressed. * indicates


































































R2 0.252 0.095 0.251 0.095
Sample Size 5,931 5,931 5,931 5,931
26Table 8: Testing for Diﬀerential Benchmarking Eﬀects
Between Younger and Older CEOs (S&P 500 Benchmark)
This table contains an OLS regression and a median regression with bootstrapped standard errors of
changes in CEO wealth regressed on ﬁrm dollar returns, benchmark dollar returns, the interaction of dollar
returns and the cdf of ﬁrm-speciﬁc dollar variance, the interaction of dollar returns and the cdf of systematic
dollar variance, the cdf of ﬁrm-speciﬁc dollar variance, the cdf of systematic dollar variance, and year
dummies. Changes in CEO wealth is deﬁned as cash compensation plus the Black-Scholes value of new
options granted plus the value of restricted stock plus long-term incentive payments, plus changes in the
value of existing options and shares. Benchmark dollar returns are estimated as the return on an equivalent
sized investment in the value-weighted S&P 500 and the benchmark. For the OLS regression, the data are
winsorized at the 1% tails and robust standard errors are calculated. This sample contains all CEOs whose
age is at or below the median age of 56 years old. Standard errors are in parentheses for both methods
and the Pseudo-R2 is reported for the median regression. Estimated coeﬃcients for the year eﬀects are


































































R2 0.243 0.263 0.077 0.118
Sample Size 2,768 2,742 2,768 2,742
27Table 9 Testing for Diﬀerential Benchmarking Eﬀects
Between Younger and Older CEOs (CAPM Benchmark)
This table contains an OLS regression and a median regression with bootstrapped standard errors of
changes in CEO wealth regressed on ﬁrm dollar returns, benchmark dollar returns, the interaction of dollar
returns and the cdf of ﬁrm-speciﬁc dollar variance, the interaction of dollar returns and the cdf of systematic
dollar variance, the cdf of ﬁrm-speciﬁc dollar variance, the cdf of systematic dollar variance, and year
dummies. Changes in CEO wealth is deﬁned as cash compensation plus the Black-Scholes value of new
options granted plus the value of restricted stock plus long-term incentive payments, plus changes in the
value of existing options and shares. Benchmark dollar returns are estimated based on expected dollar
returns using the 30-year T-bill rate as the riskless rate and ﬁrm-speciﬁc betas. For the OLS regression,
the data are winsorized at the 1% tails and robust standard errors are calculated. This sample contains
all CEOs whose age is at or below the median age of 56 years old. Standard errors are in parentheses for
both methods and the Pseudo-R2 is reported for the median regression. Estimated coeﬃcients for the year



































































R2 0.242 0.262 0.077 0.119
Sample Size 2,768 2,742 2,768 2,742
28